People would be vital to the effective operation of a new biocontainment facility proposed for campus, just as people are essential to the current, ongoing process of gathering public input about the proposed facility, say UC Davis officials.
"I want to know the concerns people have," said Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor Virginia Hinshaw. "Because the more information people have, the better they’re going to feel about this."
Hinshaw last week led a six-member panel of UC Davis health and safety experts that offered background on the proposed laboratory and fielded audience questions during a two-hour campus forum at Freeborn Hall.
The proposed Western National Center for Biodefense and Emerging Diseases would enable scientists to safely study the most serious disease-causing viruses and bacteria, Hinshaw said.
"The research is a way to get ahead of the diseases," said Frederick Murphy, a virologist and professor in the school of veterinary medicine and former infectious diseases center director at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.
Panel members for the Jan. 29 forum were: Hinshaw; Murphy; Steve Tharratt, a professor of pulmonary and critical care medicine; Environmental Health and Safety Director Carl Foreman; Police Capt. Rita Spaur; and Fire Chief Mike Chandler.
About a dozen audience members spoke during an hour-long question-and-answer session.
Panelists responded to multiple questions about whether there would be potential for leakage of biological agents from the facility.
Stringent protocols for lab workers, redundant safety measures, thorough air filtration and pasteurization and incineration of facility waste, the building’s box-within-a-box-within-a-box design, and numerous security checkpoints make that highly unlikely to near impossible, said Spaur, Chandler and Foreman. Given all the facility’s safety measures, Chandler said his own detailed analysis has shown that it would pose no more risk to people or the environment than any other campus building.
Murphy, who has spent some 25 years working with the CDC, said: "I’ve watched the evolution of biocontainment and I’ve worked on every high-containment virus you can think of."
Researchers at the BSL4 would not be working with the kinds of materials that, for instance, end up on the soles of shoes, Murphy said. Agents are enclosed in sealed containers during handling, he said. "Diligent people following protocols don’t let agents out," he added.
Some audience members were concerned that a fanatical scientist could purposefully contract a virus in order to spread it.
Security and safety technology, but more importantly, people, can keep that from happening, Tharratt said. "The power of the lab is that the people who work there are monitored by people who understand these diseases," he said.
Hinshaw noted that only a handful of carefully screened individuals would be authorized to work at the BSL4 containment level. "So you know each of them well," she said. Also, researchers will work in teams of two and will be continually monitored by security cameras while they work.
There also was concern about whether the lab’s findings would be shared freely with other nations.
Noting that UC Davis is a public research university, Hinshaw said: "That is the whole point – to publicize what we do." Sharing information, she said, "is something we hold quite sacred." She also noted that BSL4 labs are being built around the world and that there would be a network of collaborations formed among the facilities.
Some audience members expressed concern that the facility might conduct research that could – intentionally or not – fuel the creation of biological weapons.
The term "biodefense" in the description of what the lab will do, Hinshaw said, applies to fighting organisms, not in creating defense systems or agents that could be used to wage war.
Tharratt noted that the agents the lab will be dealing with are not "weaponized" – that is they don’t exist in a state that makes them easy to disseminate or particularly infectious.
"But what if, during movement or shipment, a vial of ebola lands on the floor or pavement and cracks?" It’s a question Chandler said he posed to himself while researching the facility.
He said he had researched various scenarios in depth, since he could potentially be responsible for sending in members of the fire department to clean up such spills.
He and Tharratt noted that many of the viruses the laboratory would be dealing with are kept in very small quantities and actually die quite easily when exposed to sunlight or open air. "While it does spread from person to person, it’s not easy to be (initially) infected," Tharratt said.
Audience members also questioned whether the facility would be a natural target for terrorists.
Murphy, Hinshaw and Tharratt reiterated that the biological agents the lab would be working with are not "weaponized" and that they already exist in the natural environment. If terrorists were seeking those raw materials, there would be much easier methods for attaining them, the panelists said.
Finally, some members felt they had not been notified soon enough of the proposed project.
Hinshaw noted that the university had been publishing information about the project for 18 months. Additionally, six months of forums are planned, Hinshaw said, noting that information-sharing and dialogue are encouraged.
For more information and commonly asked questions about the proposed biocontainment facility, including information shared during last week’s Davis City Council meeting, see: www.news.ucdavis.edu/biodefense/wncbed.lasso.